Evaluating the Costs of Business Cycles in Models of Endogenous Growth by Gadi Barlevy
Evaluating the Costs of Business Cycles









In his famous monograph, Lucas (1987) put forth an argument that the welfare gains
from reducing the volatility of aggregate consumption are negligible. Subsequent work
that has revisited Lucas’ calculation has continued to …nd only small bene…ts from reduc-
ing the volatility of consumption, further reinforcing the perception that business cycles
don’t matter. This paper argues instead that ‡uctuations could a¤ect the growth process,
which could have much larger e¤ects than consumption volatility. I present an argument
for why stabilization could increase growth without a reduction in current consumption,
which could imply substantial welfare e¤ects as Lucas (1987) already observed in his calcu-
lation. Empirical evidence and calibration exercises suggest that the welfare e¤ects can be
quite substantial, possibly as much as two orders of magnitude greater than Lucas’ original
estimates.
¤The author acknowledges comments from Marco Bassetto, Sam Kortum, Robert Lucas, Alex Monge, Helene
Rey, and seminar participants at Nortwestern, Purdue, UC Berkeley, and USC.Introduction
In his famous monograph, Lucas (1987) put forth an elegant argument that the welfare e¤ects
of business cycles in the United States are negligible. The logic of his argument is as follows.
Consider a representative consumer with a conventional time-separable constant-relative risk







where ° ¸ 0. This consumer is given a consumption stream Ct de…ned by
Ct = (1 +Á)
t(1 +"t)C0
where Á re‡ects average consumption growth over time and "t is an i.i.d. random variable
with mean zero and variance ¾2
" that captures deviations of consumption from its trend growth
rate. The parameters Á and ¾2
" can be estimated from data on log per-capita consumption
for the United States over the post-World War II period. To determine the costs of aggregate
‡uctuations, Lucas asks what fraction of initial consumption C0 this consumer would be willing
to sacri…ce in order to stabilize his consumption stream, i.e. to replace "t with its mean
E ("t) = 0. For reasonable estimates of risk aversion °, the answer turns out to be astonishingly
small: less than 0:1%. By contrast, consumers would be willing to sacri…ce a much larger
fraction of initial consumption, about 20% when ° = 1, in order to increase the growth rate Á
by one percentage point.
Various authors have since revisited Lucas’ calculation, but for the most part have continued to
…nd only small e¤ects from stabilization, further reinforcing the perception that business cycles
have only a negligible impact on welfare. One line of attack has focused on the shock process
"t. The …rst to make this argument was Imrohoroglu (1989). She criticizes Lucas’ calculation
for its implicit assumption that agents have access to full insurance, which guarantees them the
average level of consumption each period. If aggregate shocks do not a¤ect agents uniformly
and consumption insurance is imperfect, the volatility of each individual’s consumption stream
would be greater than the volatility of per capita consumption ¾2
". But when Imrohoroglu
calibrates income streams to micro data, she …nds a cost of aggregate ‡uctuations that is not
much larger than Lucas’ original estimate: only 0:3% when ° = 1:5. Moreover, subsequent
papers by Atkeson and Phelan (1994) and Krusell and Smith (1999) argue that her notion of
1stabilization removes too much idiosyncratic risk faced by agents along with aggregate risk.
They …nd zero and even negative bene…ts to stabilization when aggregate risk is stabilized in a
way that leaves the idiosyncratic risk faced by agents una¤ected.1 Another criticism focuses on
the fact that the "t process assumed in Lucas’ calculation is not su¢ciently persistent. If agents
had to bear the consequences of aggregate shocks for extended periods, they would be more
averse to ‡uctuations. The calculations when "t follows a random walk with drift are reported
in Obstfeld (1994a). For preference parameters that are similar to those used by Lucas, he …nds
costs of business cycles that are again about 0:3%.2
A second line of attack has focused on preferences, arguing CRRA utility is too restrictive
and could underestimate the bene…ts of stabilization. Obstfeld (1994a) considers non-expected
utility preferences that separate between risk-aversion and intertemporal substitution. But
once again, by Obstfeld’s own characterization, the welfare e¤ect rises from a microscopic level
to merely small, and the estimated cost remains below 1%.3 Pemberton (1996b) and Dolmas
(1998) consider a di¤erent class of non-expected utility preferences that exhibit ‘…rst-order’
risk aversion, arguing that such preferences capture observed attitudes towards large and small
bets that are inconsistent with expected utility. Some of their estimates are very large, but
only under the assumption that "t is close to a unit root. Even when "t is autocorrelated
with ½ = :98, Dolmas reports that the costs of ‡uctuations do not exceed 1% for reasonable
parameterizations. Extensions of Lucas’ calculation therefore seem to con…rm his original claim:
the cost of consumption volatility from cycles calibrated to post-War data is trivial.
1In a parallel debate, Clark, Leslie, and Symons (1994) estimate the volatility of individual income from panel
data and estimate a cost of cycles around 0:9% for the United Kingdom. This estimate is similarly criticized by
Pemberton (1996a) for counting the reduction of purely idiosyncratic risk as a bene…t of stabilization.
2Beaudry and Pages (1999) combine the two criticisms by studying highly persistent idiosyncratic shocks.
They obtain costs of at least 1%. This approach seems a promising way to generate more costly business
cycles, especially since they introduce stabilization in a way that does not eliminate idiosyncratic risk. However,
their model is vulnerable to Lucas’ observation that if the costs of ‡uctuations stem from incomplete insurance,
policymakers might be better o¤ promoting insurance rather than stabilization.
3Tallarini (1999) argues that Obstfeld’s parameters are inconsistent with the equity premium. He generates a
large cost of business cycles using a coe¢cient of risk aversion that is orders of magnitude greater than Obstfeld.
A similar point is made in Campbell and Cochrane (1995) who use non time-separable preferences to explain the
equity premium, although Otrok (1999) argues that a more “disciplined” calibration of non-separable preferences
generates only small welfare e¤ects. These arguments notwithstanding, the equity premium does not necessarily
imply large costs of business cycles. First, the equity premium could be due to market frictions. Second, as
Alvarez and Jermann (1999) point out, the equity premium and the cost of consumption ‡uctuations are distinct.
They estimate a factor model for the marginal utility of consumption using …nancial data and put an upper bound
on the costs of business cycles of 0:3%.
2This paper pursues a di¤erent approach that could potentially generate much larger costs
of business cycles than the previous work cited above. It is motivated by Lucas’ original
observation that even small changes in the growth rate Á have large implications for welfare. As
such, if aggregate ‡uctuations somehow a¤ected average long-run growth, the costs of business
cycles could potentially be much larger than previously estimated. This possibility is ruled out
by Lucas’ thought experiment; he treats the growth rate Á as an exogenous parameter that is
una¤ected by changes in ". But standard models of endogenous growth predict the incentives
of agents to engage in growth-enhancing activities depend on the level of economic activity,
so that Á = Á("). If this growth rate Á(") is concave, stabilization will increase the long-run
growth rate of consumption. Since even small changes in Á have large welfare consequences, this
could conceivably generate costs of business cycles that eclipse those described in previous work.
The intuition behind this argument is illustrated graphically in Figure 1. Previous calculations
measure the costs of business cycles by comparing utility from the observed volatile consumption
stream represented by the heavy line with the utility from a consumption stream set to the
trend rate of the original consumption stream, as represented by the thin solid line. By contrast,
if stabilization a¤ects average growth, the cost of business cycles will be the di¤erence in utility
from the original consumption path and from the consumption path represented by the dashed
line. Since the latter provides more consumption at earlier dates, the implied costs of business
cycles could be substantial as long as agents do not discount the future too heavily. According
to this logic, the major cost of business cycles is not that consumption is volatile over time, as
has been stressed in previous work, but that ‡uctuations impede the process of growth. While
this idea has been occasionally discussed in previous work, it has yet to be incorporated into the
original Lucas framework in a satisfactory way.4 This is unfortunate, because the notion that
stabilization can increase growth and welfare is far from obvious. What assumptions imply that
the growth rate Á is concave in the level of economic activity? How much additional growth
should we expect from the elimination of cyclical ‡uctuations? Will such an increase in growth
4There is a rather di¤use literature which argues that stabilization yields bene…ts other than reduced con-
sumption volatility. For example, DeLong and Summers (1988) and Ramey and Ramey (1991) argue stabilization
increases the level of output, a point also raised in Chatterjee and Cobrae (1999). This is discounted by Romer
(1996), who cites evidence that stabilization is unlikely to a¤ect average output. More recent work studies the
e¤ects of stabilization on growth using models of factor accumulation with linear production technologies. This
includes Aizenman and Marion (1993), Hopenhayn and Muniagurria (1996), de Hek (1999), and Jones, Manuelli,
and Stacchetti (1999), as well as related work by Obstfeld (1994b) on the growth bene…ts of globalization. Except
for Obstfeld, these papers are concerned with growth per se rather than welfare. Moreover, these models do not
mesh well with the intuition behind Lucas’ welfare calculations, since faster growth in this class of models does
not necessarily imply higher welfare. Finally, Ramey and Ramey (1995) argue that volatility and growth are
negatively related based on empirical evidence from a cross country evidence. But without a model, they cannot
interpret the parameters they estimate structurally for welfare calculations.
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tnecessarily translate into higher welfare? If so, is it enough to generate larger welfare e¤ects
than in previous work?
To address these questions, I develop a model of endogenous growth in which shocks a¤ect
the level of economic activity. The model generates a reduced-form growth rate Á = Á(n(")),
where n(¢) is the amount of resources allocated to innovation activity and Á(¢) is the rate
at which better technologies for producing goods are discovered for a given level of resources
devoted to innovation. Setting " to its expected value therefore a¤ects average growth through
two channels. First, stabilization can increase growth by increasing the level of innovation n,
which will be the case if n(¢) is concave. Second, stabilization can increase growth by reducing
the volatility of n, which will be the case if Á(¢) is concave. Previous work on growth under
uncertainty has only considered the …rst e¤ect, even though it is well known that the relationship
between investment and uncertainty is ambiguous, i.e. n(¢) can be either concave or convex
depending on somewhat arbitrary functional form assumptions. Even if stabilization increased
average investment, the implications for welfare remain ambiguous, since shifting resources
from production to innovation need not make individuals better o¤. The second channel, by
contrast, is more equivocal: diminishing returns to innovation require that Á(¢) be concave, so
stabilization will increase growth from a given level of resources n. Furthermore, the increase
in growth will act to increase welfare.
The above discussion raises the question of how much growth could be generated from dimin-
ishing returns, and whether it can involve substantially larger welfare e¤ects than those that
can be traced to consumption volatility. Reduced form estimates on the relationship between
average growth and the volatility of growth based on cross-country comparisons suggests re-
moving aggregate ‡uctuations in the U.S. would raise per capita consumption growth from
2:0% to 2:5%. This increase implies a substantial cost of business cycles: when ° = 1, an
individual would be willing to sacri…ce 10% of his initial consumption to stabilize aggregate
‡uctuations and increase long-run growth, more than 100 times as much as Lucas originally
estimated. Using empirical evidence on diminishing returns to R&D from micro studies con-
…rms that even conservative estimates for diminishing returns in the production of new ideas
can generate an increase in the growth rate of 0:5 percentage points. However, further scrutiny
reveals that these estimates are based on functional forms that require implausible volatility
in investment and equity values. Still, reasonable restrictions on the extent of volatility place
an upper bound on how much stabilization can increase growth that is not much lower than
4these original estimates — roughly 2:3%, which is valued at 5¡7% of initial consumption. This
suggests that the dramatic welfare implications based on reduced form estimates are consistent
with plausible amounts of diminishing returns.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 develops the basic model of R&D with diminishing
returns to innovation. Section 2 relates this model to previous work on stabilization and en-
dogenous growth and distinguishes between e¤ects on the level of investment and the volatility
of investment. Section 3 estimates the size of the growth e¤ects that can be attributed to
diminishing returns and their implications for welfare. Section 4 concludes.
1. A Model of Diminishing Returns to Innovation
To study the e¤ects of business cycles on growth, I need a model of endogenous growth that
admits ‡uctuations in the level of economic activity. Models of technological innovation such
as Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) satisfy this criterion. These
models have two important features. First, they assume a monopolistically competitive frame-
work which allows for di¤erent equilibrium levels of economic activity. Second, changes in
economic activity a¤ect the incentives of agents to innovate by changing the size of the market
a monopolist can capture if he succeeds in developing a superior production technique. As such,
aggregate ‡uctuations will have an impact on long-run growth. I introduce ‡uctuations through
shocks to the composition of government spending. This choice is motivated to minimize the
number of auxiliary modelling assumptions that generate my results, not because I view the
composition of government spending as an important source of aggregate ‡uctuations. Ulti-
mately, the welfare e¤ects I examine occur because stabilization reduces investment volatility.
The same e¤ects could arise in any environment where innovation ‡uctuates over time and the
underlying production function for new ideas is concave; in fact, the next section illustrates
similar e¤ects in a model where the source of ‡uctuations can be interpreted as technology
shocks. Since the source of aggregate ‡uctuations does not play a role in my subsequent at-
tempts at quantifying the welfare e¤ects of stabilization, the precise way in which I model it is
unimportant.5 The model is presented in two parts. The …rst part describes its main features,
5Although the source of aggregate ‡uctuations has no bearing on the question of whether business cycles can
have …rst order welfare costs, it remains crucial for determining the feasibility and cost of stabilization, which
ultimately determines whether stabilization is desirable. But the point of this paper to challenge the notion that
business cycles have no …rst order welfare e¤ects, not to argue in favor of stabilization.
5while the second characterizes its equilibrium.6
1.1. Setup
The economy contains three agents:
1. A representative agent, who consumes goods and supplies labor
2. A government, which taxes the agent and spends the revenue it collects
3. Entrepreneurs, who hire labor to produce goods and to develop new production methods
It will be helpful to preview the respective roles of the various parties. The agent plays an
important but passive role: he consumes output, which provides us with a welfare measure
to compare di¤erent economic environments. The government, as noted above, acts as the
source of ‡uctuations, and can be used to introduce stabilization into the model. The role of
entrepreneurs, aside from producing output, is to develop better production methods. This,
in turn, determines the growth rate for the economy. The ultimate goal of the model is to
gauge how business cycles a¤ect the decisions of entrepreneurs to carry out innovation, and the
consequences this has on the welfare of the representative agent.
I now describe the three agents in more detail. First, the representative agent has standard
















6Since writing this paper, I have become aware of a related model by Fatas (1998). Aside from di¤ering in
certain details from this model, he focuses on di¤erent questions.
6where ½ > 0 is his discount rate. I choose CRRA utility despite its drawbacks which are
discussed in the Introduction; these concern attitude towards risk, which is not important for
my analysis. For this reason, ° should be viewed as a measure of intertemporal substitution
rather than a measure of risk-aversion.
The agent is endowed with L units of labor each instant. Leisure does not enter his utility
function, so he supplies all of his labor whenever the wage is positive. The agent also owns
all claims on the pro…ts of entrepreneurs in this economy, positive and negative. Following
Lucas, I initially abstract from savings; the agent must consume all of his disposable income,
which is the sum of labor income and pro…ts net of tax liabilities. However, this assumption is
not important, as is demonstrated in Section 2 where I derive similar results for a model with
savings. In the absence of saving, the only choice the agent makes is how to allocate his income
across di¤erent goods. Since Ct is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator, it is optimal to spend an equal
amount on each good j 2 [0;1]. Integrating over all goods implies the spending rate on each




pjcjdj = ¦+W ¡T
where ¦ denotes aggregate pro…ts, W denotes labor income, and T denotes tax liabilities. Let
Y ´ ¦+ W denote gross nominal income.
Next, I turn to the government sector. Government taxes the labor income of the agent and
uses this revenue to …nance various expenditures. The tax rate is a constant ¿ 2 (0;1). Since
labor supply is inelastic, this tax is equivalent to a lump-sum tax. However, the fact that the
tax is proportional to labor income is important, since it allows government revenue to grow as
labor resources become more productive. Without this assumption, government share of output
would eventually vanish. In what follows, I use labor as the numeraire good. The tax revenue
in each instant is therefore T = ¿L. I assume the budget is balanced at each instant, i.e. the
entire revenue T is always spent once collected. This revenue pays for goods the government
consumes, and for workers the government hires. Hence,
T = Gt + Nt
where Gt denotes government spending on goods and Nt denotes the total wage bill of gov-
ernment employees. Given the normalization that labor is the numeraire, the latter is also
the number of workers employed by the government. This notation might be a little confusing
7at …rst, especially since Gt is a nominal quantity while Ct is a real quantity. However, it is
convenient to work with nominal quantities in solving the model, even though we ultimately
care about real consumption. I denote nominal consumption by PtCt ´
R 1
0 pjtcjt.
Government expenditures on goods are assumed to be allocated equally across the di¤erent
commodities j 2 [0;1], i.e. spending on each good j at date t is the same amount gt regardless






Building on Matsuyama (1995), I assume the government maintains a constant tax collection
T but periodically shifts the composition of spending between goods and labor. Speci…cally,
aggregate government expenditures Gt can assume one of two values, G1 > G0, and switch
between these two values at a rate ¹ per unit of time. Denote the associated number of
government workers employed in each regime by N0 = T ¡G0 and N1 = T ¡ G1, respectively.
Budget balance implies N0 > N1, i.e. more workers can work in the private sector when
government shifts its spending towards goods.
Shifts in the composition of government spending generate aggregate ‡uctuations in the econ-
omy. This is because increased government spending on goods shifts labor resources out of the
government sector and into the public sector. Because of monopolistic competition, workers
generate more value working in production than working for the government: in the latter, they
only generate labor income, while in the former they generate both labor income and pro…ts.
Hence, a shift in the composition of government spending towards goods raises the value of
labor resources in this economy, which in turn a¤ects the scale of production in the economy.
Finally, I turn to entrepreneurs. They produce the various goods j 2 [0;1], as well as searching
for better ways of producing these goods. In both capacities, they are driven by pro…t maxi-
mization. The nature of production in this economy is as follows. Each good j is associated
with a number mj that re‡ects the highest generation of technology available for producing
that good. Put another way, mj is the number of times the technology for producing good j
has been improved upon since date t = 0. Each generation converts labor into output at a
linear rate, but successive generations are more productive. Speci…cally, the m-th generation
technology allows one unit of labor to produce ¸m units of output, where ¸ > 1 is the rate of
8progress associated with each improvement. Technologies are protected by inde…nite patents,
so only the creator of the m-th generation technology can use it to produce goods. Still, the
development of the m-th generation allows other entrepreneurs to develop the m +1-th gener-
ation, so discovering a new production technique helps both the innovator who discovers it and
his competitors.
I …rst describe entrepreneurs in their capacity as producers. Each entrepreneur will produce
using the highest generation he has access to. His only real decision is what price to charge
for his good. Since both consumer and government spending on each good are independent
of the price, demand for each good is unit elastic. Each monopolist will therefore want to set
as high a price as possible; this way, he earns the same revenue but can produce fewer goods.
But he cannot post a price that is too high; if his price exceeds the cost of producing a single
unit of his next most e¢cient competitor, the latter will post a slightly lower price and steal
away all of his business. Hence, producers quote a price equal to the marginal cost of their
most e¢cient competitor, and the entrepreneur with the highest generation of technology will
be the one supplying goods to the market. This implies that an entrepreneur with the m-th
generation technology will set his price pj to ¸¡(m¡1): his next most e¢cient competitor needs
¸¡(m¡1) workers to produce one unit of output, and each worker is paid a wage normalized to
1. At this price, the number of units the monopolist will sell is given by
Y ¡ T +G
pj
= ¸m¡1(Y ¡ T +G) (1.1)
To produce each of these units, he needs to hire ¸¡m units of labor. Hence, his total labor
requirement is given by ¸¡1 (Y ¡T + G). With labor as the numeraire, this is also the total
cost of producing the quantity in (1.1). His pro…ts will then equal his revenue net of costs, or
¼ = pjcj ¡
1
¸




(Y ¡ T +G) (1.2)
In what follows, I restrict attention to Markov equilibria in which nominal income Y depends
only on the level of government spending G; it is an open issue as to whether other equilibria also
exist. In such an equilibrium, pro…ts ¼ will depend only on the level of government spending.
Let ¼0 denote pro…ts when G = G0 and ¼1 when G = G1.
Finally, I describe entrepreneurs in their capacity as innovators. I assume there are only two
entrepreneurs in sector j at any point in time: one who owns the patent to the best available
9technology and produces output, and the other who can work on developing a better technology
for producing this good. Previous work has avoided having to make such assumptions by
imposing constant returns to scale in research along with free entry. In this case, the number of
potential entrants does not matter, and an incumbent monopolist will never choose to engage
in research in equilibrium. To allow for diminishing returns to the research e¤orts of individual
entrepreneurs, I need to impose these assumptions explicitly.7 If the entrepreneur in a given
sector who engages in research employs n workers, he discovers the next generation technology
(mj +1) at a rate Á(n) per unit of time. The function Á(n) is strictly increasing and concave,
and satis…es the usual boundary conditions lim
n!0
Á0 (n) = 1 and lim
n!1
Á0 (n) = 0. Concavity
in Á(n) is associated with diminishing returns in research and development: the contribution
of the marginal worker to the probability of success decreases with each additional worker.
Denoting the value of a successful innovation by v, the innovator’s problem is to choose n to
maximize Á(n)v ¡n, so
Á0 (n)v = 1 (1.3)
1.2. Equilibrium
With the description of the economy complete, I can characterize its equilibrium. This is just
a set of prices and quantities at each instant such that (1) agents choose prices and quantities
optimally; (2) the government budget is balanced; and (3) output and labor markets clear. As
noted before, I focus on Markov equilibria in which nominal variables vary only with the level
of government spending. It will help to point out at this stage those features of an equilibrium
which have a counterpart to Lucas’ speci…cation for consumption. First, an equilibrium is
associated with a level of household consumption at each instant. Given a history up to date
t, household consumption at date t takes on di¤erent values depending on the realization Gt.
Consumption can therefore be above or below its expected value, which is analogous to the "
term in Lucas’ speci…cation. Second, an equilibrium is associated with a level of employment
in the innovation sector, which determines the rate of technological progress at that instant.
7An alternative approach is to allow for diminishing returns in aggregate R&D but for constant returns in
the research e¤orts of individual entrepreneurs; in this case, no restrictions are necessary on the number of
researchers or who engages in research. This approach is pursued, for example, in Stokey (1995). Under this





vt = 1. None of the qualitative predictions of the
model would be changed. In addition, for the constant elasticity function Á(n) = ©n
» Stokey considers, Á
0 (n) is
proportional to n
¡1Á(n), in which case the calibration exercise on the size of growth e¤ects reported in Section
3 would also be unchanged.
10This rate is analogous to the Á term in Lucas’ speci…cation.
The main step in solving for equilibrium is to solve for employment in the innovation sector n.
To do this, I make use of the …rst order condition (1.3), which relates n to the value of a patent
v. To solve for n, I express v in terms of n to obtain an equilibrium condition strictly in terms
of n. Here, I use the approach of Lucas (1978). That is, suppose this economy had a market
for patents. Since the representative agent must own all patents in equilibrium, the value of
a patent must be such that the agent is indi¤erent between buying one and selling one. The
expected utility from buying a patent is the marginal value of consumption one could a¤ord









This has to be the same as the utility from selling the patent. In that case, the consumer can
increase his income by v, which allows him to increase current consumption. The additional















The following lemma establishes that vt is well-de…ned when ° ¸ 1, and is linear in pro…ts
under the two regimes, ¼0 and ¼1. Its proof, as well as those of all other claims in the paper,
is delegated to the Appendix.
Lemma 1: Suppose ° ¸ 1. In a Markov stationary equilibrium, the value of a successful
innovation is given by
vt =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1
!(n0)!(n1) ¡¹2 (!(n0)¼0 + ¹¼1) if Gt = G0
1
!(n0)!(n1) ¡¹2 (!(n1)¼1 + ¹¼0) if Gt = G1
(1.4)
where
!(n) = ¹ +½ +Á(n)[1 +(° ¡1)ln¸]
11If n0 = n1, the value of a patent v is higherin whicheverregime o¤ers higher pro…ts ¼; intuitively,
a patent is more valuable if it pays out high dividends today rather than in the discounted
future. But if n0 6= n1, the patent could be more valuable when pro…ts are relatively low, since
v depends not only on the timing of payouts but also on the innovation rate Á(n). This rate
a¤ects the value of a patent in two distinct ways. First, Á(n) re‡ects the rate at which a patent
is rendered obsolete by the arrival of a superior technology; a higher Á(n) therefore reduces
expected future pro…ts, making the patent less valuable. Second, Á(n) re‡ects the growth rate
of the overall economy, which could make a patent either more or less valuable. With more rapid
growth in productivity, real income grows more rapidly, raising demand for each good . This
increases future expected pro…ts, making patents more valuable. On the other hand, the more
rapidly income grows, the more uneven is the anticipated future pro…le of consumption. This
makes current consumption more valuable, reducing the value of the patent. Which of these
e¤ects dominates depends on how much the consumer is willing to substitute intertemporally.
When ° ¸ 1, so the agent is relatively less tolerant towards uneven consumption streams, the
value of a patent unambiguously decreases with Á(n).8
To express v solely in terms of n, I need to express pro…ts ¼ in terms of n. Here, I use the








njdj = ¼ ¡n
Combining this equation with (1.2) gives pro…ts ¼ as a function of n,
¼ = (¸¡ 1)(L ¡ n¡ N)




!(n1)!(n0) ¡¹2 [(!(nj) +¹)L ¡!(nj)(ni + Ni) ¡ ¹(nj +Nj)] = 1 (1.5)
While obtaining a closed form solution for n0 and n1 is not generally possible, I can still
characterize how employment, growth, pro…ts, patent values, and gross income vary across the
two regimes.
8The focus on values of ° greater than 1 is also warranted by empirical evidence on the intermporal elasticity
of substitution. See, for example, Epstein and Zinn (1991).
12Proposition 1: Suppose ° ¸ 1. Then in equilibrium,
1. Employment in the innovation sector is increasing in G, i.e. n1 > n0. Hence, the growth
rate Á(n)ln¸ is increasing in G.
2. The value of patents is increasing in G, i.e. v1 > v0.
3. Nominal pro…ts are increasing in G, i.e. ¼1 > ¼0.
4. Nominal income Y and consumption PC could be either increasing or decreasing in G;
however, both are related to G in the same way.
Proposition 1 implies that a shift in government spending towards goods accelerates innovation,
increases pro…ts, and raises patent values. Intuitively, a shift in government spending towards
goods increases demand, and consequently pro…ts, for every operating monopolist. When pro…ts
are higher, there is greater incentive to capture the market, so n increases. This raises the growth








To relate Proposition 1 to more familiar notions of business cycles, it will be useful to return to
the original Lucas setup. Recall that he posits the representative agent receives a consumption













consumption given cumulative growth up to period t, while actual consumption di¤ers from
this expectation by a stochastic term 1+"t that re‡ects cyclical ‡uctuations. As anticipated by







(1 + "(Gt))C0 (1.6)
The virtue of using labor as the numeraire good is that nominal quantities correspond to
detrended real quantities. This is because aggregate real variables grow at the same rate as labor
13productivity. Expressing the value of quantities in terms of units of labor e¤ectively removes




in (1.6), so that nominal consumption will be proportional to
1+"t. This allows us to recover deviations from trend consumption using nominal consumption,
and similarly for other real macroeconomic series in the model.
Armed with this observation, we can interpret Proposition 1 as a statement about the cyclical
properties of various variables in this economy. It is natural to de…ne the cycle in terms of real
gross income, i.e. the economy is said to be in a boom if income is above its expected growth
rate. This occurs when nominal gross income Y assumes its higher value. Proposition 1 implies
consumption is procyclical, i.e. it attains its higher value when nominal income attains its higher
value. Moreover, since the inequalities in Proposition 1 are strict, employment in the innovation
sector, pro…ts, equity values, and growth all ‡uctuate over time, although the direction of
these series over the cycle is ambiguous. The fact that growth could be either procyclical or
countercyclical should not be entirely surprising. Aghion and Saint Paul (1998) previously
showed growth could be either procyclical or countercyclical, depending on the speci…cation for
R&D. This model makes a similar prediction, but for a di¤erent reason: with monopoly power
in the production of goods, diverting workers from production to innovation reduces current
income. If the increase in G diverts enough resources to innovation, gross income could fall
even as each producer’s pro…ts rise. This is similar to e¤ect in Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998)
where the arrival of a more productive technology causes income to fall as resources are diverted
to innovation. Empirically, pro…ts, equity values, and R&D expenditures are all procyclical,
which points to procyclical growth. This is also plausible given that innovation represents only
a small share of the aggregate economy. Fortunately, though, whether growth is procyclical or
countercyclical is irrelevant for how stabilization a¤ects growth. The latter depends on whether
Á(") is concave in ", not on whether Á(") is increasing or decreasing in ". It is to this issue
that I now turn.
While it is useful heuristically to represent stabilization as favorable for growth whenever the
growth rate Á is concave in the level of economic activity ", recall that the growth rate and the
level of economic activity are determined simultaneously in equilibrium. Hence, the equilibrium
growth rate is not technically a function of the scale of economic activity. To determine if
stabilization increases long-run growth, then, we must introduce a stabilization policy directly
into the model and compare its equilibrium growth rate with the growth rate that prevails
when ‡uctuations are allowed. Since government spending is the source of ‡uctuations, and
14since its level is set by policymakers, it seems natural to de…ne a stabilization policy as one
which sets government spending on goods constant at the average of the two regimes, i.e.
Gt = 1
2 (G0 +G1) » = G for all t. Let n(G) denote the number of workers employed in innovation
when government spending is constant and equal to G, and n¤ (G) denote the number of
workers employed in innovation when government spending ‡uctuates but is currently equal








2 [Á(n¤(G0))ln¸ +Á(n¤(G1))ln¸] (1.7)
The notation is meant to suggest that stabilizing government spending in this economy will
increase growth if the growth rate Á(n(¢))ln¸ is “e¤ectively concave” in government spending
on goods. This is a modi…ed notion of concavity, since (1.7) compares the average realized
growth rate under two di¤erent stochastic processes for Gt, i.e. it compares the function Á(n(¢))
at G with the average of a di¤erent function Á(n¤ (¢)). The real concavity of Á(¢) establishes
the following su¢cient (but not necessary) condition for stabilization to increase growth:






2 [n¤(G0) + n¤(G1)] (1.8)
In other words, stabilization increases growth if it increases average investment n. Importantly,
though, stabilization increases growth even if (1.8) holds with equality, i.e. when stabilization
has no e¤ect on average investment. This is because with diminishing returns to innovation,
the fact that stabilization reduces the volatility of innovation activity acts to increase growth.
Intuitively, stabilization shifts resources from peak periods of innovation, when their marginal
product is low, to periods of less intensive innovation, when their marginal product is high.
Of course, the resulting increase in growth could be o¤set if stabilization also reduces average
employment in the innovation sector, i.e. if condition (1.8) is violated. The model does not
allow us to pin down whether (1.8) is in fact satis…ed, since this depends on the third derivative
of Á(¢). To see why, recall that n is determined by the …rst order condition Á0 (n)v = 1. In
order to establish whether n depends on v in a concave or convex manner, we di¤erentiate this
…rst order condition twice, which involves the third derivative Á000 whose sign and magnitude is
ambiguous. This ambiguity re‡ects an indeterminacy in the relationship between investment
and uncertainty that has already been well appreciated in the literature: depending on the
15production function and the investment cost function, investment can either increase or decrease
in response to a mean preserving spread in pro…tability.9
To summarize, stabilization has an ambiguous e¤ect on growth; but under diminishing returns,
stabilization unambiguously increases growth for a given level of average investment. To better
understand the role of the latter channel, I focus on the special case in which stabilization has






2 [n¤(G0) + n¤(G1)] (1.9)
Aside from theoretical interest, there is empirical justi…cation for condition (1.9) in the recent
work of Ramey and Ramey (1995), who study the relationship between growth and volatility
for a sample of 92 countries and a subset of 24 OECD countries. They …nd increased volatility
in output growth is associated with lower average output growth, but not with signi…cant
di¤erences in investment rates. Ramey and Ramey …nd this puzzling given conventional wisdom
that equates growth e¤ects with changes in investment. However, this pattern is consistent
with the notion that it is diminishing returns to innovation rather than changes in the level of
innovation that lead stabilization to a¤ect growth. Thus, their …ndings suggest we can ignore
changes in average investment in studying the e¤ects of stabilization on growth.10 Under this
restriction, the model unambiguously predicts stabilization increases growth. More importantly,
this increase in growth raises the welfare of the representative agent.
The last statement above underscores an important observation: even though both diminishing
returns and changes in average investment allow stabilization to a¤ect long-run growth, the
two channels have di¤erent implications for welfare. If stabilization raises growth by increasing
average investment, the e¤ect on welfare is ambiguous: shifting resources from production
into innovation could make the agent better o¤ or worse o¤, depending on his preferences
between current and future consumption. But if stabilization increases growth by reducing
9For example, Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983) develop models where investment increases under uncertainty,
while Bernanke (1983) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) develop models where investment decreases under uncer-
tainty. Caballero (1991) presents a uni…ed framework in which investment can either increase or decrease with
uncertainty, depending on the parameters of the production function and the investment cost function.
10I should note that Ramey and Ramey use a broad measure of investment, while investment in this model
only re‡ects expneditures on R&D. One should therefore interpret the implications of their results for this model
with some caution. Still, the next section illustrates a factor accumulation model with similar implications and
which admits a broader interpretation of investment.
16the volatility of investment, the agent will be unambiguously better o¤. This follows from the
welfare calculations reported in Lucas (1987). Recall that he …nds substantial welfare gains
from increasing the growth rate Á while holding average initial consumption C0 …xed. The next
lemma con…rms that (1.9) insures setting Gt at its average value of G also sets consumption
equal to its average value:
Lemma 2: Stabilizing government expenditures on goods also stabilizes consumption if and











2 [n¤(G0) + n¤(G1)]
Diminishing returns therefore capture the intuition conveyed in Figure 1, i.e. stabilization
results in a consumption stream that originates at the same initial level but grows more rapidly
thereafter. By contrast, if stabilization increases growth by shifting resources into innovation,
the resulting consumption stream would start at a lower average consumption level than is
illustrated in the Figure. An increase in growth due to higher average investment will therefore
not generate the same welfare gains as a similar increase in growth from diminishing returns,
which is another reason why I focus on the latter channel. Hence, if stabilization a¤ect growth
only through diminishing returns, the growth e¤ects of business cycles involve unambiguous
welfare costs. The key question is whether these costs are larger than those computed in
previous work. The answer to this question hinges on two issues. First, we need to assess
by how much business cycles retard growth for plausible degrees of diminishing returns, an
issue I address in Section 3. Second, although (1.9) rules out changes in average investment by
assumption, we need to make sure that changes in average investment do not have additional
implications for welfare that wipe out the costs due to diminishing returns. Judging by the
evidence in Ramey and Ramey, these e¤ects are likely to be small. In addition, the next section
develops a model with di¤erent underlying assumptions that insure any changes in equilibrium
investment, regardless of their impact on growth, increase welfare. In this case, the e¤ects of
stabilization holding the level of investment …xed necessarily provide a lower bound on the costs
of business cycles.
As a …nal remark, note that Lemma 2 implies stabilizing government expenditures on goods also
stabilizes consumption if and only if average employment is unchanged. This re‡ects a theme
that has often been ignored in the literature, namely that there is no one correct notion of
17stabilization. Lucas, for example, considers a policy setting consumption to its average value.
This model considers a policy of setting government expenditures on goods to its average
value. The two policies are only equivalent under strong linearity conditions, as represented
by condition (1.9). Without linearity, it would be impossible to simultaneously set several
macroeconomic series equal to their average. But policies that stabilize di¤erent macroeconomic
variables are conceptually quite di¤erent, and one has to be careful in comparing results based
on di¤erent underlying notions of stabilization. To that end, imposing (1.9) is theoretically
appealing because the model corresponds to exactly the same notion of stabilization that Lucas
used in arguing business cycles involve relatively minor costs.
2. Alternative Models of Endogenous Growth
As noted in the Introduction, various authors have already investigated the implications of
volatility in models of endogenous growth. However, even though this literature studies the
e¤ects of stabilization on growth, it has not discussed the welfare implications associated with
such growth e¤ects, nor has it examined how these models relate to Lucas’ welfare calculations.
This section revisits this literature and discusses its relationship to the model of the previous
section. There are two reasons for doing this. First, the growth e¤ects described in previous
work re‡ect changes in average investment rather than diminishing returns. As such, these
models do not necessarily imply faster growth is bene…cial for the agent. Moreover, they con-
tinue to imply only negligible costs of business cycles for reasonable parameter values, which
highlights the importance of diminishing returns. Second, previous authors have relied on mod-
els of factor accumulation with linear production technologies to generate endogenous growth
rather than technological innovation. This section shows that this di¤erence is irrelevant, and
the results of the previous section could be obtained in models where factor accumulation is the
engine of growth. Since the model di¤ers in several dimensions from the one in the previous
section, it clari…es that some of the simplifying assumptions in the previous section are not
responsible for its results.
Consider the following model, taken from Jones, Manuelli, and Stacchetti (1999).11 Time is
11Aside from Jones, Manuelli, and Stachetti, various authors have used this model to study endogenous growth
under uncertainty. It was …rst developed as a model of saving under uncertainty by Levhari and Srinivasan (1969).
They solve an in…nite horizon version of a problem …rst studied by Phelps (1962). Leland (1974) subsequently
reinterpreted their model in terms of growth, and Eaton (1981) demonstrated how to introduce government
18discrete. There are now two agents: the representative agent and the government. The agent
has no labor resources, but is endowed with an initial amount K0 of capital. He also has access
to a linear production technology that converts a unit of capital into 1 + ¸ units of output,
where ¸ > 0. Each period, the agent uses all of his capital to produce output. He then decides
how much of this output to consume and how much to leave as capital for the subsequent
production. This is in contrast with the previous section, where the agent was unable to save
his income for future consumption. Production depreciates away all of the capital, so the only
capital available for production in period t+1 is that which was set aside in period t. The agent
has a conventional CRRA utility function over consumption in each period, and discounts the
future at a rate ¯.
Just as before, I use government policy as the source of ‡uctuations in the model, although as
previous authors have pointed out, policy shocks in this framework are isomorphic to technology
shocks. That is, one can reinterpret the model as one where technology shocks drive ‡uctuations
and tax policy is an instrument to stabilize against them. To remainconsistent with the previous
section, I will stick to the interpretation of shocks originating from government policy. Since
there is no labor, government spending is devoted entirely to purchasing output. To …nance
its expenditures, the government taxes the income of the agent, so it takes a fraction ¿ of the
output produced. As before, the budget is balanced every period, i.e. Gt = ¿tYt. In contrast
to the previous section, Gt now denotes real government spending. Once again, the share of
government spending can assume only two values, which I assume is i.i.d. over time.12 From
budget balance, this implies the tax rate ¿t can take on two values ¿1 < ¿0, each equally likely.
This leaves the agent with (1 ¡¿t)(1 +¸)Kt ´ (1 + ¸t)Kt units of output each period.13 The













Kt+1 = (1 + ¸t)Kt ¡Ct
policy into this framework.
12By contrast, the previous section assumed Gt was Poisson, implying persistent shocks. Jones, Manuelli, and
Stacchetti (1999) also examine a version of the model with persistent shocks.
13I restrict ¿0 and ¿1 so that ¯E [(1 ¡ ¿t)(1 + ¸)]
1¡° < 1, which insures an interior solution.
19where K0 is given and 0 · Ct · (1 + ¸t)Kt. Applying a perturbation argument to the …rst
order conditions of the agent, it can be shown that the solution to this problem is given by
Ct = c(1 + ¸t)Kt
Kt+1 = i(1 + ¸t)Kt









and c = 1¡ i. The growth rate of consumption is given by
¢Ct+1
Ct
= i(1 +¸t+1) ¡1 (2.2)
which in equilibrium is also the growth rate of output. The growth rate is proportional to the
investment rate i, and thus depends on the behavior of the agent.
Just as in the previous section, we can gauge the e¤ects of stabilization by setting the share of
government spending on output, and thus the tax rate ¿, to its expected value. This amounts
to setting ¸t equal to its average value. The only way this will a¤ect the average growth rate in
(2.2) is by a¤ecting the propensity to save i. From (2.1), stabilization increases average growth
if and only if ° < 1. Since estimates of ° are 1 or greater, stabilization either has no e¤ect on
growth or causes it to fall, in contrast with the previous model. But the fact that stabilization
decreases growth does not imply the agent is worse o¤. After all, stabilization induces a lower
growth rate because it leads the agent chooses to voluntarily consume a greater fraction of his
output, i.e. to increase c and reduce i = 1¡c. Revealed preference implies that the agent must
be better o¤ under lower growth. More generally, because the equilibrium in this economy is
Pareto optimal, any change in the equilibrium level of investment must make the agent better
o¤, since the central planner cannot make the agent better o¤ by reallocating resources into or
out of the innovation sector. By comparison, the equilibrium in the previous section was not
Pareto optimal given monopoly distortions and the inability of agents to borrow or lend, which
is why changes in average investment could have reduced welfare in that framework.
Since stabilization can a¤ect the savings decisions of the agent, this model also suggests growth
e¤ects which imply that Lucas’ calculation underestimates the welfare under stabilization. In
terms of Figure 1, the welfare of the household after stabilization does not correspond to
20the consumption path set to the trend rate of the original consumption stream; instead, the
consumption stream under stabilization could rotate depending to the optimizing decision of
the agent. But the new consumption stream under stabilization will not be the same as the
dashed line in Figure 1; for the consumption stream to have a steeper pro…le, i must be higher.
But this implies that the initial level of consumption C0 = cK0 is lower, since c = 1 ¡i. Thus,
the model above generates an additional cost of business cycles that re‡ects the e¤ects of the
cycle on the time pro…le of consumption, but which relies on changes in average investment and
is therefore di¤erent from the channel of diminishing returns outlined in the previous section.
Moreover, the model suggests this e¤ect is likely to be quite small for reasonable estimates of
°. For the case where ° = 1, there are no growth e¤ects and the model reduces to the one
considered in Obstfeld (1994a), which involves a welfare gain from stabilization of only 0:3%.
Using the estimated volatility in growth reported in the next section, I also computed the e¤ects
of stabilization for the case where ° = 2. For this value, the average growth rate declines from
2:00% to 1:98%. The implied welfare gains are once again almost identical to those reported
by Obstfeld, which systematically fall well short of 1%.
While the above discussion suggests existing models of endogenous growth under uncertainty
imply only small costs of business cycles, we could easily introduce diminishing returns in
investment into these models and recover the potential for much larger e¤ects. Following Uzawa
(1969), suppose that the capital stock in period t+ 1 is given by
Kt+1 = ©(It;Kt)
where It = (1 +¸t)Kt ¡ Ct is the part of disposable income that is not consumed. The
function ©(¢;¢) is increasing and concave in I. This functional form implies that only © percent
of investment actually turns into capital, while the remainder of investment is eaten up in the
process of installing the capital. I further assume the installation function exhibits constant
















´ Á[ i¤(¸t)(1 +¸t)] ¡1
21where i¤(¢) is the fraction of after-tax income devoted to investment when ¸ ‡uctuates over
time. This growth rate is not the same as the conditional growth rate of consumption, but
the two growth rates have the same unconditional expectation, and it is this expectation which
is relevant for welfare. Stabilizing ¸t continues to have ambiguous e¤ects on expected growth
which depend on ° and the third derivative Á000. However, just as before, diminishing returns
imply that stabilization will increase average growth for a given ratio of investment to capital.
We can isolate the e¤ects of diminishing returns by restricting attention to the case where the










[i¤(¸0)(1 +¸0) + i¤ (¸1)(1 + ¸1)]
The implications would then be identical as those of the model presented in Section 2. The
only di¤erence is that unlike that model, changes in average investment regardless of direction
will necessarily make the agent better o¤. Thus, the welfare gains from diminishing returns in
this model represent a lower bound on the costs of business cycles, and it will be enough to
show diminishing returns on their own generate large welfare e¤ects to establish that business
cycles are costly.
3. Quantitative Analysis
The preceding discussion has argued that business cycles involve welfare losses that operate
through endogenous growth channels, particularly because of diminishing returns in investment.
But the most interesting question still remains: are these growth e¤ects large enough to generate
costs of business cycles that exceed those based only on consumption volatility? One way
of addressing this question is to abstract from the source of diminishing returns and focus
instead on the reduced form implications of the model for the relationship between volatility
and average growth. This approach only requires information on the relationship between
volatility and growth, either over time or from a cross section of countries. Such estimates are
readily available from the work of Ramey and Ramey (1995). Using cross-country evidence,
they …nd that controlling for the average investment share, a one percentage point reduction in
the standard deviation of output growth is associated with an increased growth rate of 0:2%.
Since the standard deviation of output growth in the U.S. is 2:5%, this implies stabilization
should increase the growth rate from 2:0% to 2:5%. Applying Lucas’ estimate that an agent
would sacri…ce 20% of consumption for a 1 point increase in growth when ° = 1 implies a
welfare gain of 10% of initial consumption, two orders of magnitude greater than Lucas’ original
22estimate. Moreover, since Ramey and Ramey …nd no evidence of systematic changes in average
investment rates associated with di¤erent levels of volatility, there should be no o¤setting e¤ects
from changes in average investment that could lower welfare in a second-best world.
While these estimates imply an enormous cost of business cycles, we should proceed with some
caution before we accept them as evidence of costly business cycles. After all, di¤erences in
growth rates across countries could be due to unmeasured heterogeneity, a possibility that is
underscored by the fact that some of Ramey and Ramey’s estimates change dramatically with
the addition of certain explanatory variables. While their point estimate for the coe¢cient on
volatility tends to be clustered around 0:2%, their estimates range between 0:1 and 0:9%. In
addition, although the negative relationship between the volatility of growth and the average
rate of growth is statistically signi…cant, it is not estimated with great precision. This suggests
looking more deeply at the source of diminishing returns to assess whether it could plausibly
generate an increase in growth from 2:0% to 2:5%.
For stabilization to generate higher growth from a given level of innovation, two conditions
are necessary: the amount of innovation n has to be volatile over the cycle, and the function
Á(n) that maps resources employed in innovation into growth has to be concave. Standard
measures of R&D inputs compiled by the National Science Foundation, including industry
expenditures on R&D and the number of workers employed as scientists or engineers, certainly
exhibit volatility over time; log changes in both series have a standard deviation of about 5%.
Moreover, work by Fatas (1994) shows that changes in R&D expenditures are related to the
business cycle, although that relationship seems to have weakened in the 1990s. But these
measures may fail to adequately capture the volatility in all of the inputs that enter into R&D.
For example, volatility in innovation might be better re‡ected in the time spent by scientists and
engineers on innovation projects rather than in employment numbers. This is partly addressed
by using R&D expenditures, but this measure too is likely to be problematic. For instance, the
physical implementation of new technologies is likely to be counted as investment rather than
R&D, even though resources devoted to implementation should be counted as inputs into the
innovation process. Hence, instead of calibrating the model to the volatility of data on R&D
expenditures, I calibrate it to the volatility of consumption growth. In other words, rather than
matching the volatility of inputs that go into producing innovation, I match the volatility of
the outputs of innovation. Since the ultimate goal is to predict the growth rate in the absence
of cycles, it seems only reasonable to calibrate the function Á(n) to the growth rates we do
23observe over the business cycle.
To measure volatility in growth in a way that is consistent with the theoretical framework
above, I discretize (1.6) and estimate its underlying parameters from annual consumption data.
The model implies consumption between period t¡ 1 and t will change for two reasons. First,
technological innovation improves productivity and allows more consumption goods to be pro-
duced from a given amount of resources. This growth rate is equal to Á(nt)ln¸, which depends
on the underlying growth regime in the current period. Second, regime changes trigger changes
in the amount of resources employed in production and thus the level of consumption. The
change in log consumption between two periods is therefore given by
¢lnCt = Á(nt)ln¸+ ("t ¡"t¡1) (3.1)
In …tting this stochastic process to actual consumption data, I maintain the implicit assumption
of two regimes, which I denote by st 2 f0;1g.14 Without loss of generality, I designate st = 0
as the low productivity growth regime, i.e. Á0 · Á1. Let " = "1 ¡ "0 denote the di¤erence in
the level of consumption across the two regimes. With this notation, we can rewrite (3.1) as
Á0(1 ¡st)+Á1st +"(st ¡ st¡1). I then estimate Á0, Á1, and " from annual data by minimizing





(¢lnCt ¡ [¸0(1 ¡st) + ¸1st + "(st ¡ st¡1)])
2 (3.2)
We can think of this minimization problem in two stages. First, for each sequence fstg, I look
for the vector (Á0;Á1;") which minimizes mean square error. I then look for the sequence of
realizations st for which this minimum mean square error is lowest. The problem with solving
(3.2) is that the number of possible sequences involves 249 = 5:6 £ 1014 combinations. To get
at the minimum, I follow a routine that is similar to simulated annealing. That is, I guess
an initial sequence of st and then allow for small stochastic perturbations around the original
sequence. If a lower value is achieved, I use the new minimum as my initial sequence. I repeated
this procedure from several di¤erent initial conditions and also allowed for larger perturbations
to check against local optima. The estimates at the minimum were Á0 = :002, Á1 = :038, and
14Maintaining the Markov structure is essential for identi…cation. To see why, consider the general equation
¢lnCt = Át + ¢"t. The problem is that since innovation depends on the scale of economic activity, Á("t) and
¢"t are correlated. If we allow "t to follow a generalized AR process, it will be impossible to identify Á("t) from
¢"t, since both reduce to lag functions of "t. Even if we impose that "t is i.i.d., we could not separately identify
½(Át;¢"t) and var(Át). However, we can still estimate a range for var(Át) by looking across all values of ½. The
standard deviation of Át lies between 0:6 and 3:0%, which includes my estimate of 1:8% below.
24" = ¡:007. This implies that the growth rate in consumption because of technological progress
‡uctuates between 0:2% and 3:8% per year, for an average of 2% per year, just as Lucas …nds.
The fact that the point estimate for " is negative suggests consumptiongrowthis countercyclical,
i.e. consumption grows more rapidly if it is below its expected level. This …nding is somewhat
disturbing, since I previously argued procyclical growth is more consistent with the empirical
evidence on procyclical pro…ts and equity values. However, this is not important for calculating
the e¤ects of stabilization, and, as I discuss further below, it is not very robust.
The …nal step in computing the growth e¤ects associated with stabilization is to specify an
innovation rate Á(n) and calibrate it so that it generates growth rates of 0:2% and 3:8%.
Previous models of technological progress that allow for diminishing returns have tended to
focus on the constant elasticity function Á(n) = ©n»; for example, this is the speci…cation
Stokey (1995) uses to study the implications for diminishing returns on equilibrium growth.
The main advantage of the CES function is that it corresponds to the functional form empirical
researchers have estimated from micro data. In particular, there is now a sizable literature
that estimates production functions for new ideas by using R&D expenditures as the input and
patents as output. This speci…cation accords with a narrow interpretation of innovation in the
model, since the model treats each patent as a successful innovation. More generally, not all
patents contribute equally to growth; but estimates of diminishing returns from patent data
should provide an upper bound on the true » as long as the production of successful innovations
exhibits diminishing returns in the number of patents. Griliches and Pakes (1984) and Hall,
Griliches, and Hausman (1986) both estimate that the elasticity of patents with respect to
total R&D expenditures at the …rm level is 0:6, while the elasticity with respect to current
R&D expenditures is only 0:3. These …ndings suggest fairly strong diminishing returns, but
at the level of the …rm; external spillovers at the aggregate level might cause these estimates
to exaggerate the extent of diminishing returns in aggregate R&D. However, Kortum (1992)
estimates R&D production functions at the industry level and …nds even greater diminishing
returns, with the estimates of the elasticity in the range between 0:1 and 0:25. Doubling
the total resources devoted to R&D in an industry leads to a smaller increase in successful
patenting than a doubling of resources devoted to R&D in a particular …rm would, suggesting
that diminishing returns carry over to more aggregate levels as well.





employment given that Á(n0)ln¸ = 0:2 and Á(n1)ln¸ = 3:8. Although this question might
25appear to require more information in order to identify n0, n1, ©, and ln¸, the CES function















Using the most conservative estimate of » = 0:6, setting R&D at its average level implies a
growth rate of 2:52%, exactly the same as the reduced form estimates from Ramey and Ramey.
Other estimates would imply even larger growth e¤ects. Thus, estimates of diminishing returns
from micro data are consistent with the increase in growth that we see using reduced-form
regressions on cross-country comparisons.15
Although the consistency in estimates from two distinct empirical approaches might be reassur-
ing at …rst, the CES speci…cation above hides several discomforting features that should cast
doubt on its relevance. The CES function can match the volatility in consumption growth rates
only if R&D resources are incredibly volatile; the implied ratio of R&D levels between peak










which is implausibly large for even a broad de…nition of innovation activity. Likewise, from
the …rst order condition (1.3), we know that the ratio of equity values is proportional to the













The problem lies in the restrictive functional form imposed by the CES function; the only way to
generate the low level of growth associated with the low productivity regime is to have very few
resources devoted to innovation. This is inconsistent with the fact that consumption growth
can be almost zero even as aggregate R&D expenditures remain high. Thus, the constant
elasticity function provides a poor approximation for characterizing the aggregate production
of innovation.
Unfortunately, the literature o¤ers little guidance as to what a more reasonable innovation
function might look like. Still, the model provides some restrictions on the shape of the function
15It should be noted that the CES function Á(n) = ©n» is not consistent with (1.9). Numerical simulation of
the model suggested that average employment in innovation declines under stabilization, although the extent of
the change depends on additional parameter values.
26Á(n) that allow us to gauge whether a function that implies more plausible volatility can
generate an increase in growth that is consistent with the estimates in Ramey and Ramey.








This restriction turns out to be useful in determining whether more plausible levels of dimin-
ishing returns can generate signi…cant increases in growth. The reason for this is illustrated
graphically in Figure 2. We know that the growth rate Á(n)ln¸ assumes a value of 0:2 at some
employment level n0 and a value of 3:8 at some other employment level n1. Suppose the slope
of the growth rate with respect to n evaluated at n1, i.e. Á0 (n1)ln¸, is equal to some real









From (3.3), we know that at n = n0, we have Á0 (n0)ln¸ =
v1
v0
a. The two lines originating
at n0 and n1 with these respective slopes form an upper envelope for any possible function
Á(n)ln¸, as illustrated in the Figure. Maximizing Á
¡1
2 [n0 + n1]
¢
ln¸ over all possible values of
a, we can derive an upper bound on how much additional growth could be generated in a model
which generates reasonable volatility in equity values. Proposition 3 establishes this bound as



















The bound in Proposition 3 is tight, since there exists a concave piecewise linear function
Á(n) for which the growth rate at average employment is exactly equal to the bound. Thus,
Proposition 3 is a precise estimate of the maximum possible increase in growth that can be
obtained through diminishing returns for a given level of volatility implied by
v1
v0
. At the same
time, the restriction implied by (3.3) does not impose a lower bounds on how much growth
diminishing returns could generate, since values of a near either of the endpoints in (3.4)




ln¸ is arbitrarily close to 2:0%.












lf(n)Proposition 3 therefore tells us only whether the growth e¤ects estimated in Ramey and Ramey
could arise under plausible formulations of diminishing returns, not whether they in fact do.
In estimating the ratio
v1
v0
, a natural benchmark is stock market data which re‡ects the value
of …rms over the cycle. Conventional estimates, such as Christiano and Fisher (1998), suggest
the standard deviation of the S&P 500 is on the order of 10%. However, since new …rms tend
to have more volatile equity values, and new …rms are listed in exchanges and included in stock
indices such as the S&P only with a lag, this is likely to be an underestimate of true volatility
in pro…t opportunities over the cycle. As an alternative measure, recall that v is a weighted
discounted ‡ow of pro…ts across the two regimes. Hence, the ratio of pro…ts in the two regimes
serves as an upper bound on the ratio
v1
v0
. Data on after-tax corporate pro…ts in the U.S.
suggests a standard deviation for ¢ln(pro…ts) of about 10 ¡ 15%.16 A standard deviation of






= 1:35. If the standard deviation of v is allowed to
be as large as 20%,
v1
v0
will equal 1:5. Substituting this into (3.5) yields
Á
¡1
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Since this calculation is independent of n0 and n1, the above estimates imply that diminishing
returns that rely on reasonable volatility in both R&D and in equity values can still allow
stabilization to increase growth from 2:0% to as much as 2:36%, well within the margin of error
of the estimates provided by Ramey and Ramey. This implies an upper bound on the costs of
business cycles of 0:27£20 = 5:4% of initial consumption when the standard deviation of v is set
to 15%, and 7:2% when the standard deviation is equal to 20%, both of which are signi…cantly
larger than previous estimates for the costs of business cycles. While these bounds suggest that
estimates in Ramey and Ramey are slightly overstated, they do not rule out signi…cant growth
e¤ects as inconsistent with empirically plausible levels of diminishing returns.
I end my discussion with two remarks. First, although my estimates are identi…ed by estimating
a two-state model, similar results obtain when I estimate a three-state model that allows for
16This covers the same period 1951¡1998. This estimate accounts for detrending implied productivity growth
using consumption growth. Detrending has only a minor impact on the estimate of the standard deviation, since
¢ln(pro…ts) is far more volatile than ¢ln(C).
28three growth rates Á0 · Á1 · Á2 and for two changes in levels "2¡"1 and "1¡"0. In estimating
the three-state model, I obtained a negative point estimate for the lowest growth rate ¸0. Since
technological regress is incompatible with the model, I repeated the minimization under the
constraint that ¸0 ¸ 0. The estimates then were ¸0 = 0:000; ¸1 = 0:022 and ¸2 = 0:036,
"2 ¡ "1 = :008, and "1 ¡ "0 = ¡:001 and "2 ¡ "1 = :009. The di¤erence between the lowest
and highest growth rate is the same as in the two-state model, so the upper bound on the
increase in growth implied in Proposition 3 would be unchanged. But the three-state mode
is still noteworthy in several respects. First, unlike the two-state model, it does not predict
countercyclical growth: "2 ¡"1 is positive, so that more rapid growth is associated with higher
consumption levels. The estimate for "1 ¡ "0 is negative, but is essentially indistinguishable
from 0. Second, it provides some evidence of diminishing returns, since j"2 ¡"1j > j"1 ¡"0j
while j¸2 ¡ ¸1j < j¸1 ¡ ¸0j. Lastly, the sequence fstg that achieves the smallest mean square
error in the three state model accords quite well with conventional measures of the business
cycle, in contrast with the two-state model which requires a fair amount of volatility to match
consumption growth, especially in the 1990s when annual consumption growth was consistently
close to its historical average of 2:0%. The three-state model, on the other hand, accords almost
perfectly with NBER business cycle dates. The simulated consumption paths and changes in
consumption for the two-state and the three-state model are illustrated in Figure 3.
Second, although I have focused on innovation as the engine of growth, the same basic argument






. The reason I chose to focus on R&D is both because it seems to be a
more relevant source of growth for developed countries such as the U.S., as well as the fact
that estimates of curvature in investment based on q-regressions appear to be noisy and less
reliable. Still, whatever estimates there are point to substantial curvature in investment, since
investment appears to respond so sluggishly to changes in q. I did experiment with introducing
adjustment costs to the model presented in Section 2, and I could generate growth e¤ects on
par with Ramey and Ramey using speci…cations for Á(¢) that match empirical estimates in
the investment literature. As in the case with R&D, these estimates turned out to rely on
implausible volatility in investment. However, we can once again establish an upper bound
similar to that in Proposition 3. In the model developed in Section 2, the ratio of Á0 (¢) turns
out to depend on the volatility of the investment to consumption ratio. Since this series has a
standard deviation of about 15%, this model again con…rms that reasonable speci…cations for
the underlying mechanism of diminishing returns can account for the growth e¤ects documented
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Actual 3 State 2 Stateby Ramey and Ramey, which in turn imply large welfare costs of business cycles.
4. Conclusion
This paper explores the costs of business cycles in a model of endogenous growth. Although
previous work has explored the role of aggregate ‡uctuations in models of endogenous growth,
and has even noted that growth e¤ects could have implications for the costs of business cycles,
the notion that business cycles involve substantial costs has yet to be analyzed formally. This
paper identi…es diminishing returns to innovation as an important channel in allowing business
cycles to generate substantial welfare e¤ects for plausible empirical conditions. Reduced form
estimates from cross-country comparisons suggest that for the U.S., this channel would generate
an increase in growth from 2:0% to 2:5%, which is associated with an increase in welfare for
which an individual would be willing to sacri…ce 10% of his initial consumption. Estimates of
diminishing returns from micro data are consistent with these reduced form estimates, although
they require implausibly volatile R&D and equity values to generate observed volatility in
consumption growth. Still, restrictions on the innovation function that accord with volatility
data allow an increase in growth from 2:0% to 2:36%, well within the range of estimates from
cross-country data and which continue to deliver costs of business cycles that are far larger than
reported in previous work.
Since there is already an extensive literature on the relationship between growth and cycles, it
would seem …tting to end with a recap of what this paper contributes to this literature. First and
foremost, it emphasizes the e¤ect of volatility on growth through diminishing returns to invest-
ment, whereas previous work has emphasized the e¤ect of stabilization on average investment.
This explains why previous work has made con‡icting predictions on the e¤ects of stabilization
on growth, re‡ecting a general ambiguity on the e¤ects of uncertainty on investment. The
model presented here is just as ambiguous about the theoretical implications of business cycles
on average growth since the average level of investment can either rise or fall when ‡uctuations
are reduced. However, it unambiguously predicts stabilization will increase growth at a …xed
level of investment. Since empirical evidence …nds little evidence that volatility a¤ects average
investment rates across countries, this appears to be the more relevant channel for studying the
e¤ects of business cycles on long-run growth.
Second, this paper examines the welfare e¤ects of stabilization rather than just the e¤ects of
30stabilization on the growth rate per se. Carrying out these welfare calculations explicitly shows
that business cycles can matter. This conclusion stands in contrast to the large body of work
which computes only small welfare gains from the volatility of consumption over the business
cycle. As the discussion in the Introduction reveals, the initial observation by Lucas that
consumption volatility from aggregate ‡uctuations has negligible welfare implications seems to
have held up to subsequent scrutiny, except perhaps when such shocks are both very persistent
and highly volatile. This is because ‡uctuations in aggregate consumption in the post-War era
are su¢ciently small that they fail to register any impact for reasonable aversion to ‡uctuations.
But this does not imply that stabilization cannot produce …rst order welfare e¤ects through
other channels. In a sense, this paper closes the circle that Lucas originally began: he used
his calculation to argue that because consumption volatility has negligible welfare e¤ects, only
growth matters. But if business cycles a¤ect the process of long-run growth in a way that is
consistent with his thought experiment, which this paper argues, they will matter as well.
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I begin by characterizing the evolution of the discount factor ±t+s and of expected pro…ts Et [¼t+s]
assuming government spending remains constant between t and t + s, i.e. where for all ¿ 2 [t;t +s],
G¿ = Gi:

























= ln(Yt+s ¡ T) ¡
Z 1
0
[ms (j) ¡1]dj ¢ ln¸





[ms(j) ¡ 1] = E [ms (j)]¡ 1
The last step uses the fact that (mt+s ¡mt) » Poisson(Áis). This implies as long as the same



































[(1 ¡ Áidt) ¢ 0 +Ái (ln¸)dt]dj
= Ái (ln¸)dt
so that as long as regime i prevails between time t and t + s, we have
Ct+s = Cte(ln ¸)Áis
3. Pro…ts ¼t+s are either equal to ¼i if a better technology was not invented and 0 if it was. For
a constant level of government spending, the probability that no new discovery is made between
dates t and t +s is given by e¡Áis. Hence,
Et[¼t+s] = ¼ie¡Áis
Combining these three results, the pro…t ‡ow at time t + s evaluated according to the respective and









¼i exp(ln¸(mt ¡1 + Ái (1 ¡ °)s)) if no new innovation arrives
(a probalitity e¡Áis event)
0 else
A su¢cient condition for vi to be …nite is for
½ + Ái + (° ¡1)ln¸Ái > 0
which is satis…ed for ° ¸ 1.
De…ne zt = eln ¸(mt¡1+Ái(1¡°)s). If the regime changes at time t + s, then we update the value of m
according to
mt+s = mt +Ái (1 ¡ °)sIt follows that the evolution of zt exhibits the following law of motion within a given regime:
_ zt
zt
= ¡Áit(° ¡ 1)ln¸
The value of owning a patent can therefore be characterized by the following asset equation
½vi(z) = z¼i +¹(vi ¡ vj) +v0(z) _ z ¡ Áivi
= z¼i +¹(vi ¡ vj) ¡zÁi (° ¡ 1)(ln¸)v
0
i (z) ¡Áivi
so we have a system of equation
(½ + Á0 + ¹)v0 (z) ¡ ¹v1 (z) +zÁ0 (° ¡ 1)(ln¸)v0
0(z) = z¼0
(½ + Á1 + ¹)v1 (z) ¡ ¹v0 (z) +zÁ1 (° ¡ 1)(ln¸)v0
1(z) = z¼1
To solve the above system, we guess
v0 = ¯0z
v1 = ¯1z
Matching coe¢cients yields the coe¢cients !0 and !1 reported in the text. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1: I begin by showing that n1 > n0. For suppose not, i.e. n1 · n0. Then the
fact that N0 > N1 implies
L¡ N1 ¡n1 > L ¡N0 ¡ n0
so that ¼1 > ¼0. Since n1 > n0 and Á




[½ +¹ +(1 + (° ¡ 1)ln¸)Á(n1)]¼0 + ¹¼1
[½ +¹ +(1 + (° ¡ 1)ln¸)Á(n0)]¼1 + ¹¼0
<
[½ +¹ +(1 + (° ¡ 1)ln¸)Á(n0)]¼0 + ¹¼1
[½ +¹ +(1 + (° ¡ 1)ln¸)Á(n0)]¼1 + ¹¼0
=
¹(¼0 +¼1) + [½ + (1 +(° ¡ 1)ln¸)Á(n0)]¼0
¹(¼0 +¼1) + [½ + (1 +(° ¡ 1)ln¸)Á(n0)]¼1
< 1
However, from the …rst order condition (1.3), n0 > n1 ) v0 > v1, which is a contradiction. Hence,
n1 > n0. This establishes part (1) of the Proposition. From the …rst order condition (1.3), this also
implies v1 > v0, which establishes part (2).
To establish (3), suppose that n1 ¡ n0 > N0 ¡N1 > 0, so




(½ +¹ +(1 + (° ¡ 1)ln¸)Á(n1))¼0 +¹¼1
(½ +¹ +(1 + (° ¡ 1)ln¸)Á(n0))¼1 +¹¼0
>
(½ +¹ +(1 + (° ¡ 1)ln¸)Á(n0))¼0 +¹¼1
(½ +¹ +(1 + (° ¡ 1)ln¸)Á(n0))¼1 +¹¼0
=
¹(¼0 + ¼1) +(½ + (1 +(° ¡ 1)ln¸)Á(n0))¼0
¹(¼0 + ¼1) +(½ + (1 +(° ¡ 1)ln¸)Á(n0))¼1
> 1
which contradicts the fact that v1 > v0. Hence, ¼1 > ¼0, establishing (3).
To show (4), note that nominal income is given by
Y = ¦+ W = ¼ + L¡ n
so that Y1 ¡Y0 is given by
¼1 ¡ ¼0 ¡(n1 ¡ n0) = (¸ ¡ 1)(N0 +n0 ¡ N1 ¡n1) ¡ (n1 ¡n0)
= ¡¸(n1 ¡n0) ¡ (¸ ¡ 1)(N1 ¡ N0)
whose sign is ambiguous since we can only establish that
N0 ¡N1 > n1 ¡ n0 > 0




(n1 ¡ n0) > n1 ¡ n0
It is possible to generate results whether the …rst inequality is and is not satis…ed. The fact that
C = Y ¡T establishes (4). ¥
Proof of Lemma 2: Applying my previous results, we have that for each regime i 2 f0;1g,
(PC)i = Yi ¡T
= ¦i +L ¡ni ¡ T
= (¸ ¡ 1)(L¡ Ni ¡ ni) +L ¡ni ¡ T
= ¸(L¡ ni) ¡ (¸ ¡ 1)Ni ¡T
= ¸(L¡ ni) + (¸ ¡ 1)Gi ¡ ¸T













Rearranging these two equations and using the fact that G ¡ 1
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establishing the claim. ¥











By concavity we know that
Á(n) > Á(0) +Á
0(n)n
Since Á(0) = 0 by assumption, it follows that the derivative is positive. ¥
















At the maximum, the two expressions must be equal, since if they are not equal, it would always be
possible to increase this expression either by increasing a or decreasing a, depending on which expression
is larger. Solving for a at the point of equality and substituting back in yields the desired result. ¥References
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